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 ‘Disappearing Workers’: Foxconn in Europe 
and the changing role of Temporary Work Agencies 
 
Abstract 
This article investigates the role of Temporary Work Agencies (TWAs) at 
Foxconn’s assembly plants in the Czech Republic. Drawing on the 
ethnographic fieldwork, it shows TWAs’ comprehensive management of 
migrant labour: recruitment and selection in the countries of origin, cross-
border transportation, work and living arrangements in the country of 
destination, and return to the countries of origin during periods of low 
production. The article asks whether the distinctiveness of this specific mode 
of labour management can be understood adequately within the framework 
of existing theories on the temporary staffing industry. In approaching the 
staffing industry though the lens of migration labour analysis, the article 
reveals two key findings. Firstly, TWAs are creating new labour markets but 
do so by eroding workers rights and enabling new modalities of exploitation. 
Secondly, the diversification of TWAs’ roles and operations transformed 
TWAs from intermediaries between capital and labour to enterprises in their 
own right.  
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The role of Temporary Work Agencies (TWAs) is predominantly investigated 
in relation to firms’ demands for short-term flexible labour, determined above 
all by seasonal aspects of production, the need to find labour for jobs seen as 
undesirable, such as assembly line work, and the desire to reduce the labour 
costs and contractual responsibilities of direct employment (Grimshaw et al., 
2001; Kalleberg et al., 2000; Koene et al., 2004; Thommes and Weiland, 
2010). To counterbalance this body of literature focusing on firms’ rationales 
for agency work, more recent research explores the temporary staffing sector 
itself. This new emphasis reveals that TWAs operate as active labour market 
intermediaries and need to be considered as an industry in their own right 
rather than as passive mediators between client firms and workers (Peck and 
Theodore, 2002). As a way of broadening the existing insights into the role of 
TWAs as labour market intermediaries, Coe et al. (2010) identify temporary 
staffing agencies and migration as a key area for the future research agenda 
on the staffing industry. They suggest studying three areas of TWAs’ 
intervention: provision of transport and documentation, facilitation of 
migration, and arrangement of accommodation and work in the country of 
destination (Coe et al., 2010: 1065-6).  
 
This article focuses on migration in particular and examines the variety of 
roles and services agencies perform in relation to migrant workers. These 
diversified activities are explored in the context of Foxconn’s manufacturing 
plants in the Czech Republic because firstly, the electronics industry is 
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heavily reliant on temporary agency workers and secondly, Foxconn has 
extensive experience of large-scale deployment of internal migrants at its 
mainland Chinese factories (Chan et al., 2013). In offering a detailed reading 
of activities that TWAs perform in order to supply Foxconn plants with 
workers, this article contributes a more substantive theoretical account of 
TWAs’ actions than that proposed by Coe, et al. (2010). It uses the idea of 
‘disappearing workers’ to signal the ways in which the intervention of TWAs 
at every stage of the labour migration process enables new modalities of 
worker exploitation. TWAs render invisible both the presence of agency 
workers from Foxconn’s official workforce and the irregularities concerning 
their working conditions.  
 
By illustrating TWAs’ involvement in the entirety of the labour migration 
process (i.e. recruiting migrant workers in their countries of origin, organising 
cross-border travel, managing migrant workers’ labour inside the factories, 
and handling their housing in the destination country), the article sets out to 
address a specific question. That is, can the distinctiveness of the specific 
modes of labour management developed and practiced by TWAs be 
understood within the framework of existing theories on the temporary 
staffing industry? In asking this question, the article problematises the widely 
accepted view, typical of the temporary agency work literature that posits 
TWAs simply as intermediaries between capital and labour.  
 
This article contends that the operating of agencies changes labour 
processes and relations. The theoretical contribution lies in revising the 
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premises of the flexible work paradigm and in understanding how migration 
shapes labour regimes in contemporary global capitalism. In arguing that 
TWAs are creating new cross-border labour markets through a 
comprehensive management of the migrant workforce that brings together 
countries of origin and those of destination as well as spheres of production 
and reproduction, the article extends the existing literature on the staffing 
industry, atypical work, and triangular employment relationship.  
 
 
Temporary work agencies and the triangular employment relationship  
 
The nature and role of TWAs is commented on most frequently in the context 
of the so-called triangular employment relationship between the client firm, 
the agency and the workers. Regarding client firms’ demand for temporary 
agency workers, Peck and Theodore (2007: 175) show how agency work 
assumes a ‘shock absorber’ function for client firms in order to manage 
fluctuations in productive activity by externalising costs and regulatory risks. 
Workers, another point in the triangle, resort to TWAs for various reasons. 
They might seek the flexibility offered by short-term contracts, multiple 
workplaces and non-standard working hours, and/or their employment choice 
might be limited by the gendered and racialised segmentation of the labour 
market (Forde et al., 2008; Vosko, 2000). Given their role in constructing the 
market for temporary employment, TWAs weaken the standard employment 
relationship and facilitate an expansion of the temporary and flexible 
employment (Peck and Theodore, 2001; Ward, 2005). Moreover, Elcioglu 
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(2010) argues that TWAs reproduce precarity by actively obstructing the 
transition from temporary to permanent work as a way of securing reliable 
profit. It is this role in driving labour market deregulation and transforming the 
structure of employment relations that gives TWAs heightened prominence 
as active agents in market-making (Coe et al., 2010; Peck et al., 2005).  
 
Additionally, research into contemporary factory-production regimes, where 
temporary agency workers are a significant part of the workforce, illustrates a 
further aspect of the triangular employment relationship. Building on the 
notion of the ‘dual control system’ (Gottfried, 1992) in their study of car 
assembly plants in France, Purcell et al (2011) show the overlapping system 
of sanctions enforced on workers by agency and client firm alike. As Vosko 
(2000) suggests, such a relationship between the agency and the client firm 
intensifies control over the labour process and, given the lack of a permanent 
contract, engenders tougher working conditions which agency workers have 
little ability to influence or change.  
 
The above research into TWAs offers important insights into the ways 
agencies increase atypical work, characterised by casualisation, high levels of 
unpredictability and widespread insecurity, as well as how the triangular 
employment relationship, which mediates the interaction between TWAs and 
client firms, intensifies control in the labour process. Despite its wide scope, 
the literature on TWAs has yet to tackle the relationship between migrant 
labour and the staffing industry. The issue of labour mediation in relation to 
migration is addressed by the migration studies literature that focuses 
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predominantly on informal labour contractors, either as individuals or groups. 
With the exception of Pijpers’ (2010) study of international work agencies 
recruiting Polish workers for Dutch employers, investigation of formal TWAs is 
scarce and tends to focus on the role of agencies in recruiting migrants 
already present in the destination country (see also McDowell et al, 2008; 
McKay and Markova, 2010). These gaps notwithstanding, the migration 
studies perspective helps to pinpoint several aspects key to the contracting of 
migrant labour. Firstly, labour migration is a process and, in order to 
understand migrants’ working conditions in the country of destination, it is 
necessary to examine the recruitment practices in the country of origin as well 
as the dynamics of cross-border travel (Kapur, 2005; Author B). Secondly, via 
its approach to migration and employment, the state is a key actor in 
promoting the conditions in which profiting from migrant labour is able to 
flourish. Informal contractors play an important role in that they facilitate 
cross-border movement and access to work for those migrants whose mobility 
is restricted by visa and immigration regulations (Čermáková and Nekorjak, 
2009; Author A). Thirdly, resorting to labour contractors places migrants in a 
vulnerable situation because of the debts accumulated to pay for the 
contractor’s services that might include recruitment and cross-border travel as 
well as access to work and housing (Anderson and Rogaly, 2005). In poorly 
regulated sectors like horticulture, the food industry, care and sex work, the 
engagement of informal contractors is likely to reinforce migrants’ precarity 
and foster situations of forced labour (Anderson, 2010; Geddes et al., 2013).  
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Drawing on the above, this article makes an original contribution to research 
into the staffing industry by approaching it through the lens of migration 
labour analysis. The predominant focus of the staffing industry literature on 
TWAs involves examining agencies mediation role and the employment 
practices they adopt. Beyond this focus, a migration labour perspective 
makes visible a varied chain of activities, actions and roles that agencies 
undertake across national borders when contracting migrant workers. The 
organisation of production begins in locations far from the actual workplace 
since it is not only bound to the specificity of the workforce inside the factory 
but also to how this specificity is managed outside the factory. In broadening 
the field of analysis from employment practices to recruitment, transportation 
and the reproduction of labour, the article makes visible how these 
operations alter agencies’ relationship with the client firm and hence the very 
premises of the triangular employment relationship. Migrant labour presents 
a conceptual and theoretical challenge to the staffing industry and the 
contemporary factory-production regimes literature in two ways. Firstly it 
demonstrates the inadequacy of a national frame of analysis, and secondly it 
makes visible the shortfalls of attempts to theorise labour processes by 
focusing predominantly on the politics of production in the workplace.  
 
 
Research context, method and data  
 
The Czech Republic is an important hub for an export-oriented electronics 
assembly and Foxconn’s most important European site, but remarkably little 
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is known about Foxconn in Europe. Foxconn, a Taiwanese-owned 
corporation, is the largest electronic manufacturing firm in the world. While it 
has plants in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Turkey and Russia, to 
date scholars only investigated the activities of the company’s factories in 
mainland China (Pun and Chan, 2012; Pun et al, 2010). Radosevic (2004) 
notes that among emerging markets Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 
developed as the second-tier global location in the electronics industry, just 
behind East Asia, thanks to regional comparative advantages such as low 
labour costs, skilled labour and proximity to the EU market.  
 
Foxconn entered the electronics market in the Czech Republic in 2000 when 
it acquired a former socialist conglomerate’s infrastructure belonging to the 
Tesla Group in Pardubice, about 100 km from Prague. Seven years later it 
built a new factory in nearby Kutná Hora. Both plants assemble desktops, 
laptops, servers and printer cartridges for major brands such as HP, Sony, 
Samsung, Chimei, Innolux, Cisco and, until a couple of years ago, Apple. 
Together the two factories employ, either directly or indirectly, about 10,000 
workers and rely heavily on agency workers for assembly line operations.  
 
This article draws on the ethnographic study of Foxconn assembly plants in 
the Czech Republic consisting of 63 interviews and participant observation 
such as living in the dormitories and sharing workers facilities. The interviews 
are comprised of an interview with a top manager, 25 with agency workers, 
23 with core workers, and 14 with key informants. The majority of core 
workers, employed directly by Foxconn are Czech nationals aged 30 to 50, 
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with the others being Slovak, Mongolian, Vietnamese and Ukrainian. Czech 
and Slovak core workers, usually men, married and with children, have a 
vocational education, are employed on permanent contracts as foremen, 
supervisors and group leaders. Non-EU core workers, both men and women, 
have university-level education and are employed as repair workers or 
operators. The 25 agency workers come from Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia 
and Poland and are men and women, aged 20 to 35, not married and without 
children. They have vocational education are recruited to carry out 
exclusively assembly-line jobs. A minority of workers are older men and 
women, aged 50 to 65, accompanied by their grown up children, and working 
in packing. 
 
All research participants were informed about the scope of the research and 
gave their consent to be interviewed. While the name of the firm and of 
TWAs are ‘real’, workers’ names are replaced by pseudonyms. To guarantee 
participants anonymity, interviews were conducted outside the factory, in 
bars, parks and dormitories. Foxconn’s Human Resources Department and 
the TWAs supplying workers to Foxconn were made aware of the ongoing 
research but refused to be interviewed. Other key informants that provided 
perspectives on TWAs and Foxconn’s operations were representatives of the 
Pardubice Labour Office and Labour Inspectorate, the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs, the Metalworkers Federation (KOVO) and the Czech-Moravian 
Confederation of Trade Unions (ČMKOS). 
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The fieldwork took place over a total of 30 days over 3 visits in February, 
June and September 2012. Structuring the fieldwork in three stages was 
motivated by the fact that the majority of interviews were conducted in 
languages other than English (Czech, Polish, Romanian, Bulgarian, 
Ukrainian, Mongolian and Vietnamese) and involved securing the services of 
translators who were often available only for short periods of time. As the 
authors relied on translations provided by two research assistants and 
several other language-specific translators, field notes became a crucial tool 
for recording key aspects of the interviews at the end of each day and, as the 
fieldwork progressed, for noting more reflexive observations and discussions. 
Staying at the same dormitories as the workers facilitated access to the field 
and offered valuable opportunities for observing the functioning of the 
dormitories and workers’ interactions and routines. Even though the 
dormitories rent out the majority of their rooms to the TWAs on a permanent 
basis, they also offer accommodation to paying guests.  
 
 
Managing migrant labour 
 
Foxconn started using agency workers in late 2004 when the Czech 
government introduced the concept of agency employment into the Labour 
Code and set out the rules for temporary work (Hála, 2007). At the Pardubice 
plant, 2,000-2,500 out of 5,000-6,000 were agency workers; at Kutná Hora, 
the number was 1,000-1,500 out of a total of 2,500-3,000 workers. The 
percentage of agency workers remained steady at about 40 per cent 
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although at times, as in 2009, it peaked at 60 per cent (Bormann and Plank, 
2010: 41). Foxconn’s reliance on agency work took place in a context of 
market uncertainty and, as a trade union representative at Foxconn plants 
explained, constant turnover of core workers: 
 
Comparing to the Czech Republic more broadly, there is a high 
turnover of workers. I cannot tell you concrete numbers, but monthly it 
is around 30 persons at least who leave and arrive to Foxconn. It 
varies. If a project finishes then it could be 100 persons. It can take 
half or even a whole year before another project starts. Meanwhile 
Foxconn does not keep the workers. (Dobroslav, male, Czech, core 
worker) 
 
With around 25-30 per cent turnover of core workers per year and high levels 
of seasonal fluctuation in production, the importance of temporary agency 
workers became evident. Foxconn relied mainly on three TWAs: Xawax, 
Express People and VVV Tour. Every agency specialised in the recruitment 
of particular nationalities, although at times they also recruited workers of 
other nationalities: Xawax worked mostly with Romanians, Express People 
with Slovak and Polish workers, and VVV Tour with Bulgarians. This division 
was steady and Foxconn did not seem to change agencies frequently. The 
only change since 2004 was that Xawax has replaced VVV Tour as the 
largest supplier of temporary workers. Whether with Slovaks, Romanians, 
Poles or Bulgarians, all three agencies operated in a similar manner.  
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Workforce recruitment in countries of origin and cross-border travel 
 
The type of TWAs engaged in cross-border recruitment and selection were 
small or medium-sized rather than large operators and focused on the 
recruitment of groups of workers. Large agencies, as McLoughlin and Münz 
(2011) suggest, do not participate in cross-border recruitment as they target 
individuals rather than groups of workers. TWAs supplying workers to 
Foxconn recruited and selected workers directly in the countries of origin via 
online and newspaper advertisements and did not charge workers for these 
services. Agencies provided potential workers with initial job information and 
selected workers on the basis of having no medical condition or criminal 
record as well as passing a basic maths and logic test: 
 
I found out about Foxconn from an advert that said that there will be a 
gathering in Katovice where they told us what to do regarding getting 
the job, sorting out the work documents, how to go about getting to the 
GP etc. There were about 70 people together and the agency 
transported us straight away to Hurka [workers’ dormitory] in three 
buses that held around 25 people each. It was done through an 
agency called SK Express based in Slovakia and Express People, 
which is the same agency. (Dariusz, male, Polish, agency worker) 
  
Following the first round of selection, recruitment modalities happened rather 
quickly. Some workers said they were recruited just a few days before 
starting work at Foxconn. As well as responding to adverts in local 
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newspapers or online, migrants also contacted work agencies themselves if 
they had a friend or a family member working at Foxconn whose migration 
had also been facilitated by the TWAs.  
 
Transport to the Czech Republic was organised by the agencies at no cost to 
the workers. Using coaches or minivans, stopping at various points to collect 
workers, agencies moved workers from their countries of origin directly to the 
Foxconn plants in the Czech Republic. There the workers were put onto local 
coaches and divided between dormitories that were located off site and about 
20-30 minutes drive from the factory. These operations typically took place at 
the weekend as buses arrived at Foxconn on a Sunday afternoon. On the 
Monday workers began work at the plants.  
 
As well as bringing workers to the Czech Republic, TWAs also organised 
group transportation to workers’ countries of origins (and back to the factories 
again) for the main holidays. Such group-organised movement permits 
agencies to ensure attendance and avoid delayed returns, as might happen 
when travel is undertaken individually:  
 
I got fired because I did not come back on time from Poland. I went to 
Poland for Easter and returned a couple of days late so the agency did 




TWAs’ organisation of movement was related to Foxconn’s production 
needs. During low-production periods agencies transported workers back to 
their countries of origin where they remained until production resumed: 
 
There is a group of workers that are going back home today [26 
February 2012]. So, half of the Bulgarian workers are going home now 
and will basically be waiting for the extension of production. They will 
be back on the 23 of March. (Vassil, male, Bulgarian, agency worker)  
 
The ability to move workers across national borders is to be considered in 
relation to the EU enlargement process that enabled EU-wide labour mobility. 
The TWAs rely on the new EU nationals’ right to move and work across the 
EU:  
 
I worked as a bricklayer in Hungary. In Slovakia I worked at the TPCA 
factory [a joint venture between Toyota, Peugeot, Citroen, and Audi], 
and in Italy I worked in agriculture. Now I am here. I arrived in Italy, 
Imola, in September 2011 and the salary was €6, but in March 2012 it 
decreased to €3.50 so I decided to go back to Romania. Then I 
learned that the agency was looking for people to work at Foxconn 
and I came here. (Petre, male, Romanian, agency worker) 
 
As the right of new EU nationals from Eastern Europe to move and work in 
the enlarged EU enables agencies to recruit workers in Slovakia, Poland, 
Romania and Bulgaria, so it also limits the access agencies previously had to 
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workers from non-EU countries. Agencies are not permitted to lease non-EU 
workers to client firms, and non-EU nationals who are already employed 
need to renew their work permits every six months instead of every one or 
two years as before. This created a bigger administrative burden and risk for 
employers, and it changed the composition of labour at Foxconn. A former 
HR manager at Foxconn explained how over time the number of workers 
from Vietnam and Mongolia on direct contracts decreased, and that of 
agency workers from neighbouring EU countries increased because the latter 
do not need a work permit.   
 
In the previous guest-worker regime, individual states planned, regulated and 
managed international migration via bilateral agreements (Castles, 1986). In 
contrast, states’ role within an enlarged Europe is largely limited to the control 
of non-EU migratory flows as the movement of EU workers, next to being 
autonomous, is regimented by TWAs. The nationalities of migrant workers at 
Foxconn reflected the general situation in the Czech Republic, where in 2011 
non-nationals counted for 5.4 per cent of the workforce. Migrant workers 
came mostly from Slovakia (114,000), Ukraine (70,000), Vietnam (34,000), 
Poland (21,000), Bulgaria (8,000) and Romania (7,000). There were also 
Mongolians, whose numbers dropped from 13,000 in 2008 to 3,300 in 2011; 
the restrictive immigration policy towards non-EU nationals also reduced the 
numbers of Ukrainians and Vietnamese significantly (Horáková, 2011). The 
activities TWAs undertake are therefore best seen as depending on what 
Peng (2011: 727) calls the ‘interaction between production and state politics’, 
namely the overlap between Foxconn’s production needs, cost-cutting 
 16 
pressure that corporate customers place on Foxconn, as well as state labour 
and immigration policies.  
 
 
Management of the workforce inside and outside the factories 
 
Links between Foxconn and TWAs were close. Xawax, the agency that 
supplied most workers to Foxconn, had its offices within the factory complex. 
Inside the factories agencies played an active role in the management of 
labour and were responsible for the quality, quantity and timing of the work 
performed by agency workers. The key figure from the agency was the so-
called coordinator of production, or line-leader. The role of the coordinator 
was to distribute the agency workforce on the basis of Foxconn’s needs: he 
or she attended meetings with Foxconn to get a clear idea of how many 
workers were needed on what shift, in what positions and for how many 
hours, and which workers Foxconn managers would like or not to have back. 
These decision were taken on a daily basis:  
 
The line-leader is the one distributing people between departments. 
The line-leader is the boss. He’s in charge alongside the supervisor 
from Foxconn. They distribute the work. There are workers who are 
called reserves. They can work all the positions in one line. But they 
work a different position every day, on the positions that become 
available, and the line-leader decides where they get assigned. 
(Cezara, female, Romanian, agency worker)  
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As the coordinator needed to interact with the agency workers, and as most 
of these were non-Czech speakers, the coordinators were usually of the 
same nationality as the workers and spoke (some) Czech so they could 
interpret when needed. The coordinator was responsible for agency workers’ 
performance and provided workers with their uniforms. These were colour-
coded to distinguish core workers from agency workers. This became key in 
situations of low production when agency and core workers could end up 
working next to each other on the same line. The coordinator’s roles certainly 
confirm the idea of duality of control as elaborated in the factory-production 
regimes literature discussed earlier as both client firm and agency are 
exercising control over the workers. The involvement and responsibilities of 
the coordinator also cast new light on the role of TWAs in relation to 
production. Commonly, in a triangular employment relationship that regulates 
the interaction between the client firm, TWA and workers, managerial 
responsibilities for production lie with the firm and legal responsibilities with 
the agency (Purcell et al., 2004). However, for agency workers at Foxconn 
the boundaries between the responsibilities of the agency and the client firm 
were blurred in that TWAs were directly responsible for organising, 
controlling and managing agency workers’ performance on the assembly line. 
TWAs’ extensive intervention in the labour process resulted in agency 
workers ‘disappearing’ from the client firm’s view; as a Foxconn top manager 
summed it up: ‘agency workers do not work for Foxconn’.  
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Beyond the factories, dormitories were central to TWAs’ management of 
migrant labour. In Pardubice the dormitories were located off site and across 
town, the most important being Hotel Harmony, Veselka, Hurka, Labe and 
Semtin. These dormitories were previously hotels, army barracks or earlier 
factory accommodation. Dormitories varied in size, housing between a 
couple of hundred and a thousand people. Each dormitory was, in the main, 
rented out to one agency. As TWAs provided workers to several client firms, 
workers from different industries stayed in the same dormitories. Four 
workers per room was standard, but the availability of en suite bathroom and 
kitchenette differed radically from dormitory to dormitory. At Hotel Harmony 
and Hurka, for example, rooms were equipped with a bathroom (toilet and 
shower) as well as a cooking hob. At Veselka this was not the case: on some 
floors a total of 80 people used two women’s and 5-8 men’s showers and on 
other floors there were no separate showers for women and men. Similarly, 
at Veselka there was only one kitchen, equipped with two electric hobs and 
no utensils, per entire floor. Consequently, if workers stayed in a dormitory 
such as Veselka where there was effectively no real possibility of cooking a 
warm meal and bringing it to the factory, they were likely to skip meals or eat 
snacks during their shifts. While agency workers had access to the factory 
canteen, they paid more for a warm meal (€2 to €3) than core workers (€0.2 
to €1) and, finding it too expensive, preferred not to eat in the canteen.      
 
The allocation of workers to dormitories and their distribution in rooms was 
also managed by the agencies. In Hotel Harmony, for example, each Sunday 
when new workers arrived from their countries of origin, Xawax gave the 
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receptionist a colour-coded spreadsheet listing, by room, the workers who 
were arriving, those who were leaving and those who were switching rooms. 
Workers were not allowed to swap rooms themselves and the receptionist 
too was not allowed to move workers between rooms without the approval of 
the agency. The agency employee in charge of this distribution was known 
as the ‘coordinator’ for dormitories. He or she allocated workers to rooms on 
the basis of nationality, maintained order and curbed excessive behaviour 
such as drinking, partying or bringing in external guests. Additionally, TWAs 
staff organised transport to the factory in smaller or larger vans, or drove 
workers personally when extra workers were needed on a shift. Dormitories 
were therefore pivotal for TWAs’ management of migrant labour in the Czech 
Republic. This finding demonstrates that the dormitory labour regime, 
previously assumed to be a unique feature of Foxconn's Chinese factories 
(Pun and Smith, 2007) is also an essential element of their workforce 
management practices in the EU. In the Czech Republic, as much as in 
mainland China, large-scale factory production relies on migrant labour that 
is organised so as to combine spaces of work and residence.  
 
 
Beyond the triangular employment relationship 
 
The wide reach of TWAs’ activities and roles has a significant impact on the 
triangular employment relationship as well as on the theorising of this 
relationship. In what follows the article takes a closer look at sphere of  
 20 
reproduction and subcontracting as key issues indicative of the changing 
configuration of the triangular employment relationship.  
 
 
The overlap of spheres of production and reproduction 
 
Dormitories are fundamental to TWAs’ management of migrant labour as well 
as their ability to meet Foxconn’s demands for temporary workforce. 
Dormitories facilitate cross-border labour mobility and provide a place of 
socialisation and exchange of information between workers. This is 
especially important at the moment of arrival when workers are struggling to 
orient themselves in a new environment. At the same time dormitories also 
make it possible for agencies (and Foxconn) to extract additional labour from 
workers: 
 
When I was in the dormitory the coordinator would come, knock on the 
door, enter and tell us “let’s go, there is work”. He would grab us and 
we would need to go even if we just finished our shift. He would also 
wake us up and make us go. (Karol, male, Polish, agency worker)  
 
To escape such forms of pressure some workers moved to private flats 
where they felt more independent. When workers moved into flats agencies 
contributed 3000 Czech Koruna (CZK), approximately €115, towards the rent 
and the workers put in the rest, around €150-€250. To qualify for the 
contribution workers must work a minimum of 150 hours per month. During 
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periods of low production, TWAs privileged workers in the flats and assigned 
them work first but these workers were also more vulnerable than those in 
the dormitories who did not feel burdened by the accommodation costs:  
 
Here is the thing – last month Xawax sent 200 people home, but 
they’ve kept the rest of us here at Hurka even though there was no 
work. They target people who rent, because if a worker does not fulfil 
their minimum 150 hours quota per month they cannot afford to pay 
for accommodation. I am not affected by this as Xawax provides for 
my accommodation here. (Cezara, female, Romanian, agency worker) 
 
The type of employment contract used by the agencies relied heavily on the 
dormitory system. Workers were initially signed up for a period of 300 hours, 
which functioned as a probation period, and were then promised a one-year 
contract. Usually, after the initial 300 hours, workers were simply put on 
another short-term contract. The promise of a one-year contract served as an 
incentive to complete the 300 hours that, in periods of low production, could 
take 2-3 months. During the ‘trial’ period workers were not paid their full 
wages but given an advance of 1000 CZK (€40) per week. The practice of 
signing workers on a series of short-term contracts dispels the idea that 
temporary work leads to permanent employment, and it shows that short-
term contracts are the norm for agency workers at Foxconn. 
 
Postponing the payment of wages further tied the workers to the agencies: 
workers might have been frustrated by their working conditions, dormitories 
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or the lack of work, but they were unwilling to leave until paid. The insecurity 
produced by fluctuating production and the short notice agency workers were 
given about their shifts – at best a week’s notice, at worst the same day – 
increased unpredictability and the idea that, even if there is no work today, 
there might be work tomorrow so it is best to stay put and remain available: 
 
I work in Foxconn with an agency but the problem is that we don’t 
work a lot. In January 2012 I worked only 51 hours and I earned 5,000 
crowns [€200]. Every morning I went to the factory to ask if there was 
work, but they told me that there wasn’t any for me. With me there 
were also other hundreds of workers. We are all hired by the agencies 
and we go in front of the gates and we wait for the boss to call for us. 
But they call only some ten or so workers, the others wait for a 
telephone call from the agency or go back to the dormitory. (Konrad, 
male, Polish, agency worker).  
 
It was not uncommon for workers to have to wait a week in the dormitory 
without work. Given fluctuating production requirements, the dormitories 
enabled the agencies and Foxconn to stand workers down for several days 
without risking a shortage of workers. In this way, TWAs allowed Foxconn to 
avail itself of a stationary workforce that was under discrete yet constant 
control of the agencies. Dormitories and flats are therefore key in 
constructing and maintaining a workforce marked by the feeling of what 
Gregg (2011) has called ‘work’s intimacy’, namely the anxiety that results 
from anticipation and being always potentially ready to work. Moreover, as no 
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children are permitted in the dormitories, thereby eliminating disruptions 
caused by schooling or parenting needs, the dormitories place workers 
outside the regular cycles of the reproductive sphere and orientate all activity 
towards meeting the production needs of the client firm. The only kind of 
reproduction agency workers are allowed is, in fact, manufacturing. This does 
not imply that workers, either men or women were childless. On the contrary, 
and in opposition to mainland China where Foxconn did not employ workers 
older than 35, in the Czech Republic a number of agency workers were well 
in their 40s and 50s. Some of them were separated from their children who 
have remained in the workers’ countries of origin while others have sent for 
their sons and/or daughters and these too became agency workers at 
Foxconn. Either way, migrant agency workers were both removed from a 
home life that might act as consolation between periods of paid work and 
detached from a possible form of generative community as their non-work 
sphere was colonised by the employer.  
 
Next to bringing to the fore the interdependence of the productive and the 
reproductive spheres, a focus on dormitories also makes visible the ways in 
which migrant labour alters the traditional roles and functions of TWAs. The 
dormitories can be seen, as Pun and Smith (2007) suggest, in terms of a 
regime that facilitates extension of management’s control over labour. The 
best example is perhaps the fact that when agency workers got fired, they 
lost the right to the dormitory and had to vacate their rooms in 1-2 days. 
Contrary, however, to mainland China where workers are hired directly by 
Foxconn on one- to three-year contracts and work 60 hours per week, in the 
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Czech Republic the majority of agency workers were young EU migrant 
workers hired on short renewable 300-hour contacts and working intermittent 
shifts. While TWAs might appear to have an all encompassing control over 
migrant labour, the paradox is that agencies enable migrant workers’ greater 
mobility and awareness of working conditions and wages elsewhere. Many 
migrants previously worked in another EU country and, by relying on the 
agencies and dormitories they were able to move and find work relatively 
easily. In the situation where worker mobility is not restricted by state 
imposed limits to temporary residence and work shifts and employment 
arrangements are sporadic, dormitories operate as devices that temporarily 
capture and attach a mobile and transient low-wage European workforce to 
the firm. Migrant labour alters the scope of agencies’ activities in that 
agencies take up new roles in the attempt to channel and contain migrant 
workers’ mobility, in particular through intrusions into their private sphere. 
The findings suggest then a need to extend beyond a focus on employment 
practices in the workplace in analysing triangular employment relationships. 
The situation demands consideration of how the interlocked nature of 
production and reproduction processes is enabling new modalities of worker 





Davidov (2004) remarks that the triangular employment relationship fragments 
the workforce, as core and agency workers work in the same space but do not 
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share the same employer and have different wages, rights and benefits. This 
separation was visible at Foxconn’s plants where migrant agency workers 
worked on the assembly line and core workers, who were predominantly 
Czech nationals, in positions such as foremen, group leaders, and 
supervisors. The ways in which the Czech state regulates TWAs’ activities are 
important in sustaining this fragmentation. It is relatively easy to set up a TWA 
in the Czech Republic. According to the representative of the Ministry of 
Labour, one needs to be at least 23 years old, without a criminal record, have 
three or five years of working experience, and obtain a permit issued by the 
Ministry. There is no need for an initial capital investment, only the payment of 
a 50,000 CZK administrative fee (€2,000). Next to the relaxed prerequisites in 
setting up a TWA, the Czech state also permits TWAs to contribute up to 
3000 CKZ towards workers’ housing and it lifted the ceiling that limited agency 
workers to a maximum of 20 per cent of the total workforce.  
 
These incentives enable TWAs to widen the scope of their actions. The result 
is a situation of what Vosko (2009) calls ‘ambiguity’ between the employment 
and commercial spheres in which agency workers find themselves because 
the agreement they have with the TWAs is contingent upon the existence of a 
commercial contract between client firm and the TWAs. In defining the relation 
between the client firm and the agency as a business contract between two 
participating firms, the state leaves broad scope for actions that in turn enable 
firms to circumvent the statutory employment law (see Sporton, 2013). This 
circumvention is best seen in the rollover of temporary contacts:  
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I was on a six-month contract and I was happy with that. Now agency 
is renewing my contract monthly although I have been here for over 
two years. After one month we sign the contract for three months, and 
after three months we sign it for six months. Every year there is a 
different company showing on the contract. (Cezara, female, Polish, 
agency worker) 
 
The practice of having workers sign multiple contracts needs to be seen in the 
context of recent changes to the regulation of TWAs. According to the EU 
Directive on Temporary Work, effective from 1 October 2011, after 12 weeks 
on the same job and for the same hirer, an agency worker qualifies for the 
same basic employment and working conditions as if recruited directly by the 
client firm. Agencies manage to circumvent this condition by ending workers’ 
contracts before completion of the 12 weeks and re-engaging the same 
worker on a similar contract with another branch of the same agency, usually 
registered as a company.  
 
The ambiguity around business contracts also permits TWAs to expand to 
incorporate functions of the client firm. This can be seen in the case of internal 
subcontracting, where each agency manages its ‘own’ assembly line:  
 
The effort is to make every agency separate. When the production 
was at the highest, one whole assembly line was managed by each 
agency, say Xawax, but now that production is lower, permanent 
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workers are complemented by agency workers. (Odval, female, 
Mongolian, core worker)  
 
As the client firm and the subcontractor are both effectively manufacturing 
the same product, Neo (2010: 1015) suggested that internal subcontracting is 
a strategy for disguising an employment relationship as a business 
relationship. The arrangement in which suppliers become sub-contractors 
and take greater ownership of production units in a plant, including direct 
control of contract labour, as in the case of Volkswagen’s factory in Brazil 
researched by de P. Abreu, Beynon and Ramalho (2000), points to the 
danger of subcontracting producing vertical divisions within a factory 
workforce and preventing trade union bargaining at the plant level. Such 
vertical division between core workers and agency workers was clearly 
discernible at Foxconn plants and it was compounded by the fact that the 
trade union was not much interested in the condition of migrant workers, 
largely because their turnover was rather high and they did not speak Czech 
(with the exception of Slovak workers). This lack of interest seemed to 
originate in the fact that the trade union’s concerns were framed primarily by 
a national focus and that the union pursued a narrow unionisation strategy in 
favour of core workers whereby agency staff absorbed the impact of 
fluctuation of demand for labour: 
 
The introduction of agency employment into the Labour Code proves a 
problem for the trade union to look after the interest of core workers 
and at the same time make sure that agency workers’ rights are not 
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taken away from them. If a firm loses an order then the agency 
workers are being let go first and, although we can tell core workers 
that we’ll protect their place, in reality we are facing the situation 
where core workers might get punished next. Our representative could 
also represent agency workers, but the danger then is that we could 
have a situation where the workforce is 90 per cent agency workers, 
especially in areas where the job is relatively simple to do. (Radek, 
male, Czech, trade unionist) 
 
Compared to the Volkswagen factory in Brazil, the specificity of the Foxconn 
plants lies in the fact that the sub-contractors are not component suppliers 
but rather TWAs that have not entered into a joint enterprise with Foxconn 
and have no domain knowledge in electronics. TWAs exclusively supply 
labour on a large scale, and it is precisely the fact that these are migrant 
workers, employed, recruited and housed by the agencies, that permits 
TWAs to gain ground inside the factories and increasingly take on direct 
management of production. Within this changed relationship between the 
client firm and agencies, employment irregularities concerning agency 
workers become institutionally invisible and ‘disappear’. This ‘disappearance’ 
is best illustrated by the fact that the local Labour Inspectorate considered 
subcontracting and its potential irregularities as falling beyond the scope of 
its activity despite agency workers’ structural indispensability for Foxconn’s 






This article investigates the linkages between the staffing industry and migrant 
labour and reveals how the changing role of TWAs in the globalised labour 
market is to the detriment of workers and working conditions. It argues that 
there is a need to break with the flexi-centric conceptualisation of the 
temporary staffing industry and the related triangular employment relationship 
framework as these approaches restrict the analysis to TWAs’ employment 
practices, the national regulatory context and the workplace (see Koene et al, 
2004; Peck and Theodore, 2007; Purcell et al 2004; Thommes and Weiland, 
2010).   
 
The research findings demonstrate that apart from traditional leasing of 
workers, TWAs are taking on direct management of production and 
diversifying their operations to include organisation of recruitment, 
transportation and housing of workers.  Similarly then to the dormitories in 
post-socialist China (Peng, 2011; Pun and Smith, 2007), agencies are giving 
rise to modalities of exploitation that merge spaces of work and residence for 
capital accumulation. Such functioning of TWAs represents a major departure 
from the previous model of organised labour migration flows in Europe, where 
under the guest-worker regime states arranged the recruitment and 
transportation of migrant workers while leaving the control of the labour 
process to the firm (see Castles, 1986). The change is best described in 
terms of a shift from a model of state-regulated labour migration and 
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mediation to a model of private and comprehensive management of the 
workforce, aimed at maximising the short-term utilisation of labour. 
 
The research clearly demonstrates the theoretical relevance of adopting a 
migration labour analysis for investigating the staffing industry. This is 
because it reveals the ways in which the management of migrant labour 
transforms TWAs’ traditional role from that of intermediaries between capital 
and labour to enterprises in their own right. This means that TWAs gain profit 
from the comprehensive management of migrant workforces rather than by 
simply extracting a part of workers’ wages (see McDowell et al, 2008). In 
doing so it creates 'disappearing workers'. Moreover, contrary to the triangular 
employment relationship approach, a migration labour analysis offers a more 
dynamic and integrated perspective on changing arrangements between 
capital and the state and shows the political shifts whereby certain labour 
regimes are detached from traditional forms of state authority. A key topic for 
future research on the staffing industry is then to interrogate the tensions and 
antagonisms within this emerging regime, whether between agencies and 
firms for the control of the labour process, or capital and labour for the control 
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